| OSCAL (NIST) | Catalog, profile, component definition, system security plan, assessment plan and results, POA&M, and since 1.2.0 control mapping. A complete chain from control to an evidence file with a hash; deadlines on risks; a vendor model that cannot modify a catalog | A risk exists only in assessment results and POA&M, never beside the selection it would justify. No profile change records an author. No construct carries a second language. No native signing: inline signatures were declined upstream (issue 245), which leaves byte hashes. Extension props carry a namespace string that nothing validates, and core constraints written for SP 800-53 bind other frameworks (#2118, #2112) |
| Gemara (OpenSSF) | Layered catalogues for guidance, controls, threats, risks and capabilities; mapping documents with typed relationships, strength and confidence; evaluation logs whose evidence carries a digest; schemas in CUE. Used by FINOS Common Cloud Controls and the OpenSSF OSPS Baseline | No prose in a second language. No due date or expiry on a finding or an exemption. No implementation record: the model names a layer for it and ships no schema. A risk is accepted without an approver or a date. Signing covers the published bundle's bytes and is done by tooling, outside the schema. The schemas are closed: a CUE profile can narrow them, not add a field. The policy and risk schemas are marked experimental |
| CycloneDX Attestations (OWASP, ECMA-424) | Standards as data; requirements mapped to claims and counter-claims, evidence with author and expiry, an affirmation with signatories. Signatures per object over canonical JSON, which survive re-indentation | No risk object, no record of tailoring, no language map. Evidence attachments carry no hash. The signature exists in the JSON form only: the XML schema and the protobuf definition have no place for it. Neither signer nor affirmation carries a date. Extensions are name/value strings whose registry is optional |
| CISO Assistant (intuitem) | In the tool: risk scenarios linked to controls, a Statement of Applicability export, risk acceptance with approver, date and expiry, security exceptions with an expiration date, an audit log. In the library format: more than 200 frameworks, reference controls, risk matrices, set-theory mappings, a translations map per object | Risk acceptance, exceptions and the Statement of Applicability stay in the application; they leave it through a backup export, not through the library format. No signing: byte hashes for deduplication. A library update can rewrite existing assessments. No check logic attached to a requirement. The importer ignores library keys it does not know |
| SCAP, XCCDF, OVAL | Checklists and check languages in XML. A Tailoring file changes a vendor's benchmark without editing it; an override records authority, time and reason; titles and descriptions repeat per language; a data stream can be signed and countersigned | No risk record. No due date, expiry or waiver type. No hash on a collected item. No author on a single tailoring change, and a severity can be lowered with no reason given. Re-indenting a signed stream breaks the signature. Conformant checks are OVAL and OCIL; a script in any language runs only through an OpenSCAP extension. Elements in a foreign namespace are checked only if a schema happens to be at hand |
| Regulator formats | FedRAMP's consolidated rules as JSON with a JSON Schema; BSI C5:2026 as YAML; Grundschutz++ and the ISM as OSCAL catalogues and profiles | One dialect per publisher, each structuring modality, deadlines and applicability its own way. C5 ships German and English as separate files; Grundschutz++ keeps its vocabularies in props that no validator reads |
| Mapping semantics | The relationship styles of NIST IR 8477; the STRM of the Secure Controls Framework; OWASP OpenCRE | IR 8477 defines relationships, not a file format. SCF publishes its mappings as spreadsheets and PDF and exports only its catalogue to OSCAL. OpenCRE is a hub-and-spoke requirement graph, not a catalogue format |
| in-toto and SCITT | Signed attestations with vetted predicates for provenance, verification summaries, test results and SBOMs; IETF transparency services over signed statements | No in-toto predicate attests a control or a requirement. SCITT is an architecture for transparency, not a compliance model |
| Heimdall Data Format, OCSF, SARIF | Results of checks and scans | They carry what a check found, not what a standard requires |
| NIST IR 8286 | Risk register and risk detail record schemas | No edge from a risk to the selection of controls |
| OpenControl, Compliance Masonry | YAML standards and component narratives | No meaningful activity since 2023 |
| ISO/IEC 27001 and 27002, IEC 62443, PCI DSS | The standards themselves | No official machine-readable edition; third-party renderings exist in SCF and CISO Assistant |